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CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION. LTD. By Edward S. Corwin. Claremont,
Calif.: Claremont Colleges, 1941. Pp. ix. 121. $2.00.
THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT IEAl.\NS TODAY. By Edward S. CurwAn.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941. Seventh revised edition.
Pp. xiv, 277. $2.50.
PROFESSOR Corwin can probably claim to have been the first critical ,tu-
dent of the Supreme Court's work to identify, isolate and assess the mo.t
important doctrinal innovation of the Old Court, between 1918 and 1937, in
the direction of limiting federal power-the revival of the concept of "dual
federalism." For a generation prior to the War the Court had drawn with
apparently inexhaustible invention on the due process clause of the Fuur-
teenth Amendment in improvising, multiplying and refining instruments for
the limitation of state power. It continued to do so with added vigor after the
War, notably in the fields of taxation, business regulation, the review of ad-
ministrative action, and latterly, of civil liberties. But in the matter of re-
stricting the scope and content of national action the Court was conspicu-
ously circumspect in using the identical language of the Fifth Amendment.
Whether Congress behaved itself better than its country-cousin legislatures
in the states, or whether the Court was conscious of the greater hazards it
risked in thwarting a coordinate branch, the fact was of record. The Fifth
Amendment never realized the procreative possibilities of the Fourteenth,
and until 1935 hardly half a dozen federal statutes were found wanting in
due process. If the Court was to deny Congressional will on a broad front,
it needed a more plausibly convincing argument than its own bald assertiun
of unreasonableness. When natural law was announced as due process in
the Adair and Adkins cases the audience knew that though the hand was the
hand of McCarthy, the voice was the voice of Bergen.
The need was felt in the Incomnc Tax case in 1895, when the Court rested
on a revolutionary rereading of the direct tax clause; that method was not
apt for ready generalization. A narrow definition of commerce served the
purpose in the Knight case and a few others. But that definition was in-
convenient when the Court approved the national action, as it did too often
for consistency's sake. A nearly ideal solution was finally hit upon when the
first Child Labor case was decided: the existence of the states in a federal
system must be an independent source of limitation on the purposes for which
delegated national powers may be used in domestic affairs, if the "federal
equilibrium" is to be preserved.
This concept, originated in Jefferson's time as a means of dignif)ing Re-
publican opposition to Federalist policy, and later adapted to the dialectic
needs of the slave-owning interests, was thought to have been put at rest by
the outcome of the Civil War. But "ideas are weapons" heedless of the in-
tent of their users, and this one was suitable for any opponent of dominant
national policy. So when the Sutherland Court set its hand against the trend
of federal legislation it invoked the doctrine of "dual federalism" to do a
due process job. It was better rhetorically than the doctrine that legislative
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power cannot be delegated, contemporaneously evolved by Chief Justice
Hughes to the same end, for it appealed to a symbol better grounded in tra-
dition and feeling, and it could not be so simply frustrated by the reenact-
ment of invalidated codes. It was used more frequently than due process
to check New Deal exercises not only of the commerce but also of the taxing
and bankruptcy powers, and it promised for a while to control the spending
power as well.
The same discernment that made Professor Corwin a pioneer in spotting
this development for what it was in its early stages also characterizes his three
recent lectures here published. Succinctly, with clarity and wit, and with an
unmatched breadth of perspective, he reviews the rise and decline of judicial
review in the course of the New Deal's career in Court. The background ma-
terial is familiar, but it has never been more skillfully summarized. Attitudes
toward what are appropriate governmental functions lie at the heart of con-
cepts of governmental structure. Questions of public policy, reflecting these
attitudes, become questions of power in a system of constitutional law judi-
cially enforced. The effective intervention of courts in determining these
questions depends upon the availability of alternative and opposing doctrines
for the interpretation of vague phrases in the Constitution. There were
enough of these. The conversion of the Court to laissez faire thus both en-
abled and inclined it to challenge the entire range of legislative action in
response to the depression. A novel feature of this account is the attention
to the personalities and activities of the American Bar Association, "a sort
of juristic sewing circle for mutual education in the gospel of Laissez Faire."
The story of New Deal troubles and triumphs in Court is less detailed than
that in Jackson's The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, but not less pene-
trating. It is also less partisan; the note of geniality that pervades the whole
is broken only once for an unkind, if well-deserved, thrust at Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in the Gobitis case. And Corwin prefers to dwell on
the "intracurial" rather than the external factors that produced the "revo-
lution."
The appraisal of the results since the turnabout in 1937 is equally dis-
criminating and comprehensive. The abandonment of laissez faire as a cri-
terion of the functions of government means the acceptance of a concentra-
tion of governmental power, first in the national Government, and second, in
the executive branch. Cooperation supplants competition as the guiding prin-
ciple in the division of federal and state powers; the twilight zone is gone.
Judicial power to intervene has shrunk importantly in the very act of express-
ing a disinclination to use it: "those doctrines . . . which have been hitherto
the chief sources of [the Court's] broadly supervisory powers over con-
gressional legislation have simply dried up." By choosing one set of formulas
and suppressing the antagonistic set, the power of further choice itself, on
which the possibility of review depends, is abandoned. And, finally, liberty
through government has displaced liberty against government as the prime
objective in constitutional interpretation. For those who find these conse-
quences little to their liking, the author, with a glance at events abroad, offers
a concluding crumb of consolation: "from the most formidable dangers
which today beset us the Supreme Court could scarcely have shielded us even
in the heyday of its power."
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Along with writing these lectures, Professor Corwin has found time to
bring down to date again his well-known handbook of clause-by-clause con-
stitutional exposition, the most useful of pint-size commentaries on a quart-
size subject.
HARvEY C. MANsriELD j
TiE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS. By Arthur Stone Dewing. New
York: The Ronald Press, 1941. 4th Ed. 2 vols. pp. =xii, 1550. $10.00.
SomE twenty years ago Mr. Dewing published a practical little book on
the way in which corporations raise the money needed for their business.
With the passage of time, the little book went through two more editions,
fatter each time, and approached the stature of a classic. Now, as befits a
'classic, it has become two volumes, decked out in handsome format, and
with much new matter.
These are not the only developments in the history of the book. From
edition to edition, Mr. Dewing has come to think of his handiwork as being
less of a practical manual and more of a vehicle for the expression of
personal views about the economic and political universe. In the third edition
these views were barely hinted at, though apparent enough; in this edition
a good many pages are bespangled with apologetics and polemics. Doubtless
there have been some bad fellows among corporate directors; however, in
general, they "carry out the purposes and obligation' of representation of
the stockholders in the management of corporate enterprices, with apparently
greater success and greater moral approbation than the people's representa-
tives direct the political corporations." 1 There isn't any point to empha-
sizing the danger of abuse of voting trusts because "everything in this world
is subject to the dangers of abuse, from man's procreative powers to
gooseberry tarts at Thanksgiving." 2 Industrial depressions are inescapable
phenomena and there is nothing we can do about them because "man is
impotent in the presence of economic laws." 3 The thing for government to
do is to do nothing, for does not the reason for the aggravation of the last
depression lie in the fact that "a political administration destroyed the
confidence and paralyzed the initiative of business men . . ." F Indeed,
these bureaucrats are a bad lot, so bad that one must express surprise at
"a common sense remark even from a member of the Interstate Commerce
Commission."5
Since Mr. Dewing's views are generally the good old laissez-faire, anti-
bureaucracy sentiments which adorn the campaign oratory of our more
t Assistant Professor of Government, Yale University.
1. Vol. I, p. 95.
2. Vol. I, p. 129.
3. Vol. II, p. 755.
4. Vol. II, p. 751.
5. Vol. I, p. 388.
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conservative statesmen, it might be thought that there is not much reason
for dwelling on them. But Mr. Dewing knows a good deal more of the
realities of modern business than its usual oratorial glorifiers, and the net
resultant of his polemics against the New Deal is edifying. When he comes
down from his economic Nirvana and grapples with real problems, lie often
finds it necessary to talk somewhat differently.
Thus, our author seems especially put out by the Securities and Exchange
Commission's Protective Committee Study. At least three times0 he decries
the report as "prepared for the purpose, often thinly veiled, of creating
prejudice against existing financial methods" and establishing "an ostensible
factual basis for stricter governmental regulation." Yet each time lie grudg-
ingly admits that there is something to what the report says, and when lie
comes to the Chandler Act itself, one of the end products of this bureaucratic
conspiracy to trample on business, he has no serious word of criticism. His
discussion of the Los Angeles Lumber case 7 completes the conversion. He
cannot share in the "strictures" of those who "hailed" it as a New Deal
decision. "To the unprejudiced eye it would seem to be Old Deal rather
than New Deal legal philosophy in that it supported the substance rather
than the mere form of debtor-creditor contracts." And even though Mr.
Justice Douglas "may have carried out the implications of his report on
protective committees and . . . may have lent an attentive ear to his former
colleagues on the Securities and Exchange Commission who, through Mr.
Jackson,9 presented the Government's brief - arguing for the absolute priority
theory of creditors' rights," he also followed the Boyd case and other cases
going back over half a century, 10 which is a pretty fine thing for an ex-
bureaucrat to do.
Or take the Securities Act of 1933. This is government interference with
a vengeance and many men of Mr. Dewing's economic faith have poured
vials of wrath on it. But our author knows a good deal about the ways
in which investors were bilked by corporate directors in those good old
days. So long as he can assure himself that "it was not intended as a
politically conscious means for expressing an economic ideology" but solely
to estop the offering of securities without giving adequate information to
prospective investors," then he thinks the Act is pretty good. He even finds
it possible to speak of "socially significant and economically beneficial results
6. Vol. 1, p. 173; Vol. II, p. 1247; Vol. II, p. 1290.
7. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. 106 (1939).
8. Vol. II, p. 1366.
9. One does not quite know what to make of this Mr. Jackson. At Vol. II,
p. 1364, he is described as "Robert Jackson, Esq., who presented an erudite and care-
fully reasoned brief for the United States, as ainicus curiae." But it appears imme-
diately thereafter, that "Jackson cared not a farthing for Case [the plaintiff] or is
bonds and prayed to the court to set aside the Los Angeles reorganization plan in order
to conform to a specific theory of creditor rights in reorganization technique. To this
end Case and the Los Angeles Lumber Company were guinea pigs in the Washington
laboratory."
10. Vol. II, p. 1367.
11. Vol. II, p. 1125.
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of the Act,"12 and, mnirabile dictu, of "wise" administration by the Com-
mission.13 Of course, he cannot resist taking a back handed slap or two
even here, 14 but the New Dealers will have to take some bitter with so much
unexpected sweet.
The Public Utility Holding Company Act is, naturally, a somewhat
different matter since it was in part prompted by the "ideological purpose
of extending further the bureaucratic control of government over the
utilities."'1 A We are therefore not surprised to see that the SEC has been
given power to "estop an issue [of securities by a utility operating companyl
for no reason except an arbitrary whim or fancy expressed in terms of
public interest," 16 or to see its jurisdiction described as "usurpation of
authority.' 1 7 Yet, even here, in the full flood of his jeremiad, the author's
practical sense wins mastery over emotion. He knows his holding companies
too well. The "dominant pur'ose" underlying many of the public utility
holding companies is the control of large amounts of capital with a small
investment, "in spite of the veiled eleemosynair purposes alleged by their
apologists.' And in the end, what is the objection to the Public Utility
Holding Company Act: "Other forms of the holding company are ignored;
and the evils arising from the parent-subsidiary relation in the utility, the
industrial, the railroad and the banking fields are focussed on the electric
and gas industries."' 9 Mr. Dewing will, no doubt, object if these words
are read to mean that the trouble with the Act is that it does not go far
enough. This, however, is the one concrete criticism which he offers, and
there are many who will agree with it.
And so, despite all the sound and fury of campaign oratory, Mr. Dewing's
thunder is thunder in the footnotes. His book is still, even more than ever,
the classic description of the practice of corporate finance; still the indis-
pensable manual not only of the corporate managers but of those who are
called upon to regulate the managers. Here is where the thunder echoes
with sardonic irony. Never could the politicians and bureaucrats, of whom
the author speaks so scornfully, have been able to do their job so thoroughly
and so informedly, if Mr. Dewing, and others of his knowledge and per-
spicacity, had not opened the cupboards wherein lurked the corporate skele-
tons. Those of us who believe that the high purposes of business pursuits
had become so perverted that only the restraining hand of Government could
set them again on the road of the public interest, will say: "More ptwer to
you, Mr. Dewing. Have your fling at us in the footnotes, but may you live
to give us a fifth and a sixth edition !"
A. H. FELLER'"
12. Vol. II, p. 1129.
13. Vol. II, p. 1132.
14. Especially to be noted is the somewhat heavy-handed (if Mr. Dewing will
pardon me) comment at Vol. II. p. 1126. footnote c. See also Vol II, p. 1132, footnote j.
15. Vol. II, p. 1059.
16. Vol. II, p. 1135.
17. Vol. II, p. 1136.
18. Vol. II, p. 1043.
19. Vol. II, p. 1065.
TAssociate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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CLARENCE DARROW - FOR THE DEFENSE. By Irving Stone. New York:
Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc. 1941. Pp. 570, $3.00.
WHEN Clarence Darrow died in 1938 at the age of 81, few disputed that
he was one of the great advocates of his generation. There were other
lawyers in his lifetime who contributed more to the development of legal
science, who rose to positions of greater influence, or who won larger
financial rewards, but perhaps none who could equal Darrow's eloquence
before a jury or who could match his record as a rough and tumble crusader
for the common man.
Mr. Stone has written an excellent account of Darrow's turbulent career
at the bar. From the day when, as a young lawyer, Darrow left his com-
fortable job with a big railroad and set out to defend Eugene Debs and
his associates in the American Railway Union who were accused of criminal
conspiracy in connection with the now famous Pullman Company strike,
Darrow was in the midst of many violent lawsuits which laid bare such
crucial social problems as racial prejudice, religious freedom, the rights of
labor, free speech and capital punishment. Again and again, when it ap-
peared that he was returning to a more or less humdrum practice in Chicago,
he was called upon to take over the burden of representing another "cause."
He was at the trial table representing -the striking Amalgamated Wood
Workers' International Union on charges of conspiracy in Wisconsin. ie
acted as attorney for John Mitchell and the United Mine Workers when
they presented their claims before the Commission appointed by Theodore
Roosevelt to inquire into working and wage conditions in the eastern coal
mining fields. He fought for the lives of officials of the Western Federation
of Miners in the notorious Coeur d'Alene matter, where the Union had
been charged with responsibility for the horrible murder of an ex-Governor
of Colorado. He was counsel for the McNamara brothers in the famous
Los Angeles Times bombing episode, out of which grew false charges which
led to his own indictment for jury tampering, in the subsequent trial of
which he took over the substantial burden of his own successful defense.
When the World War came he defended the conscientious objectors and
others who were caught up in the meshes of Attorney General Palmer's red
raids. In the colorful Scopes trial he entered the Bible Belt to champion
the theory of evolution against the arch-fundamentalist, William Jennings
Bryan. Finally, he acted as counsel for Leopold and Loeb, seizing the
opportunity presented by their abnormal crime to bring before the American
public his passionate distaste for capital punishment and the need for recog-
nizing the psychiatric and physiological factors which contribute to crime.
The cases Darrow tried involved basic issues which are still unsolved
today. When he proposed that laboring men should be given the right to
bargain with their employer, or when he espoused the cause of the negro
seeking equality in the eyes of the law, he was confronted with opposition
which seems almost incredible today. The press, large portions of the bar,
and the substantial preponderance of opinion in the communities affected
were all aligned against him. But the author feels that there is little evidence
that Darrow ever allowed himself to be permanently broken by the bitter-
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ness of public opinion which his activities brought down upon his head. He
seemed to realize that his were unpopular causes and that by understandable
processes it was his lot to become the personification of the ideas for which
he battled as counsel.
Darrow had no axe to grind. He was not a reformer. He had no program
for a better state, nor did he warmly espouse the political beliefs of any
particular group or party. He seems primarily to have been impelled by an
inner sympathy and understanding of those who challenged existing ways
of thought. Perhaps this was because he himself had no use for the con-
ventional thinking of his time and liked to shock people with his blunt
talk.
Because of Darrow's great interest in literature and his close acquaintance
with authors, social workers and agnostics of all kinds, his home became
a center for liberal intellectuals of Chicago. Free thinkers, single taxers,
atheists, social workers and young economists and lawyers came to his home
to hear him discuss matters of current interest and to answer his provocative
questions concerning racial equality, capital punishment and free love. He
was a man of great tolerance in spite of his many unconventional ideas and
his own life is full of many revealing inconsistencies which the author happily
does not feel required to explain. His keen tongue and ready wit made him
much sought after as a lecturer, and during some periods of his life he
spent days and weeks on the road lecturing and debating.
Darrow's courage, his ability to experience deep emotion, his earnestness,
his fighting spirit and staying power cannot be questioned. A student of
human nature, he was a master of psychology and apparently possessed
an unusual ability to make his juries appreciate the broader implications
of the decision they were called upon to render. Darrow was widely read
in both literature and the sciences. A penetrating cross-examiner, he never
let a witness leave the stand, it is said, until he had made at least one
advantageous point. So broad was his background, so sympathetic his under-
standing, and so well ordered his mind that when, at the conclusion of a trial,
he stood on his feet to make his final plea, which often ran for two or three
days on end, he never had need of a note, and his arguments as they flowed
forth were both cogent and full of passionate conviction.
In recent years most attorneys have not sought to become proficient
trial lawyers. Advocacy in the conduct of lawsuits for clients has given
way before the rise of the desk practitioner who counsels and advises on
intricate corporate problems. There are few, if any, who can lay claim
to Darrow's mantle today. Indeed, so many of our outstanding attorneys
have gravitated to business or politics or as corporation lawyers have be-
come removed from positions of public prominence, that it is not surprising
there are few biographies of noted American lawyers who have spent their
professional life in the active practice of the law. This life of Darrow is,
therefore, doubly welcome, first, as an account of the life of an active prac-
titioner, and, second, because it serves to recall to mind the great professional
opportunities which await the lawyer who succeeds at the trial table.
G=ARmD A. GEsELLf1
tember of the Connecticut and District of Columbia Bars.
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CASES AND MATERIALS ON FIDUCIARY ADMINISTRATION. By Lewis M.
Simes. Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1941. Pp. xx, 533. $5.50
IN a series of casebooks designed for three separate courses Professor
Simes has reorganized and enlarged topics traditionally covered in the courses
in Wills, Trusts and Future Interests. The first in the sequence - not yet
published in printed form-deals with intestate succession, execution and
revocation of wills, and the creation of trusts. The second covers the admin-
istration of decedents' estates and testamentary and other forms of express
trusts. The third, published in 1939, is concerned with the tying up of
property by means of future interests and trusts. The second, which is the
volume under review, calls for the most original effort and represents the
major element of pioneering in the series.
In the preface Professor Simes gives credit to Dean Gulliver of the
Yale Law School for originating the idea of a separate course in fiduciary
administration and acknowledges having profited from Dean Gulliver's dis-
cussion at a meeting of the Association of American Law Schools some years
ago. The reviewer recalls taking part in some such discussion in which
Professor Simes outlined his plan for combining treatment of administration
of decedents' and trust estates and of developing this treatment through the
parallel use of materials from two or three jurisdictions. In a feeble fashion
the reviewer opposed both the combination idea and the suggested tech-
nique of development. Objection to the combination idea was based upon
the differences in origin and function of personal representatives and trustees,
and upon the fact that administration by the former has routine supervision
by the court of probate while the trustee traditionally acts independently of
judicial supervision except in so far as some interested person may start
an action or suit for a particular purpose in an ordinary court of trial juris-
diction.
After use of the book in the classroom the reviewer concedes freely that
Professor Simes has demonstrated that these objections can be overcome
and that the combination is workable. At no point does his book slur over
the divergencies between the two kinds of fiduciaries. With consummate
skill the editor has developed both the contrasts and the similarities of the
two offices in a thoroughly teachable manner. After brief introductory
matters, the bulk of Part I deals with jurisdiction in the administration of
decedents' estates and an excellent chapter on the vital topic of the neces-
sity and effect of probate and administration. Part II is denominated "the
office of the fiduciary" and includes the topics of appointment, qualification,
removal and compensation. Part III takes up more than sixty per cent
of the book and covers management of the fiduciary estate. It includes treat-
ment of the following matters: deviation from the creating instrument; power
to borrow, mortgage, pledge, lease or sell; delegation of powers; duties of
loyalty, of care, to preserve and to earmark and to separate; accounting;
co-fiduciaries; exculpatory clauses; creditors' claims; carrying on decedents'
business; investments; benefits and burdens between life tenant and re-
mainderman; distribution of trust estates; problems of interest, abatement,
charge of debts and retainder in connection with decedents' estates; applica-
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tion for instructions." Part IV is concerned with liabilities of the fiduciary
and third persons arising out of breach of fiduciary duty.
Professor Simes has abandoned his former plan of developing the law
of two or three contrasting jurisdictions throughout the various topics. The
geographical distribution of cases is well balanced with New York pre-
dominating and' other important jurisdictions well represented. The editor
has varied his method of statutory treatment and has sometimes set forth
the statutes of his own state, Michigan,2 elsewhere included several typical
statutes,3 and again merely summarized and grouped the relevant legisla-
tion.4 In the main the latter seems the preferred method for a general
casebook because law students should consult their local statutes and gener-
ally receive little aid and still less comfort from the statutory details of other
jurisdictions. Portions of the Restatement of Trusts, the pertinent uniform
acts and other text materials are set forth at appropriate places. Footnotes
contain extensive and valuable references and frequently suggest interesting
problems. Many of the chapters are prefaced by helpful forecasts of the
questions to be considered. The book is remark-ably free from typographical
errors.5 Extremely able editing G gives the book a compactness which may
be misleading; there is enough material for forty or more class meetings,
and in a two semester hour course omission of some topics will be necessary.
The book is a success not only mechanically but from the standpoint of
broad training of lawyers and the ultimate betterment of the law. Several
factors inherent in the subject matter contribute to this success and the
editor has utilized them to the maximum in his development. In the first
place courts of probate in many states now have jurisdiction over testa-
mentary trustees as well as over personal representatives and the steps in
judicial administration such as qualification, inventory and accounting are
the same with respect to both sorts of officers. Statutes frequently use the
1. The cases on application for instructions contained in Chapter 27 can be cun-
sidered advantageously in connection with the cases on pp. 41 to 52. This is the only
point upon which the reviewer differs from the editor with respect to the arrangement
of materials.
2. See pp. 6-7, 325-32. Cf. pp. 16-20.
3. See pp. 116-18.
4. E.g., pp. 58-59, 70-71, 126.
5. The citations to Evans Y. Anderson, p. 56 n., and to WVestfall v. Dungan and
Dunlap v. Robinson, both p. 339 n., should be Ohio St. instead of Ohio. The sections to
the Restatement of Trusts in the last paragraph of p. 160 n., should be 242, 243 instead
of 232, 233.
6. In Howard v. Howard the report is faithfully followed but after a summary
of the pleadings it merely declares: "The demurrer is over-ruled for the reasons in
the last case." Some editorial comment is justified here, particularly as the case
referred to is itself somewhat obscure. In the condensation of Simpson v. Cornish on
p. 85, line 13 the word' "thereafter" is confusing and should be omitted, though its
inclusion was doubtless induced by the language of the report Cross references from ..
text or notes to cases printed elsewhere in the book would be helpful. See reference to
Allen v. Dundas (p. 2 1) printed on p. 71 and reference to Johnson v. Lawrence (p. 156)
printed on p. 168.
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term fiduciary to refer to the trustee, the executor, the administrator and
the guardian and provide certain procedures common to all. Regardless of
such unifying statutory procedure, the general powers and duties of all sorts
of fiduciaries are usually the same. This is true with reference to such
matters as the delegation of powers, the earmarking of estate property,
liabilities in representative and individual capacities and the general theory
of accounting. Combined treatment tends to emphasize that the personal
representative is a fiduciary - a point too frequently overlooked in practice
and possibly in teaching as well. Then too where the rules of law may differ
as between trustees and personal representatives, as in case of powers of
co-fiduciaries and of investments, there are marked advantages in presenting
the contrasts. Again combined treatment facilitates consideration of certain
problems such as distinguishing between an executorship and a trusteeship
where the same person is selected for both offices. Along the same line the
cases in Chapter XXI, studied with the background of the preceding material,
offer an excellent opportunity for a discussion of the interesting problem as
to whether one who carries on the business of a decedent by virtue of author-
ity given by will, statute, court order or consent is to be treated always as
a trustee- apparently the orthodox theory- or whether he may not be
regarded as an executor or administrator with increased functions- a point
of view which the reviewer submits is in accordance with what usually hap-
pens in courts of probate.
Perhaps most important of all, the use of the casebook will guarantee that
law students may obtain some familiarity with the administration of estates.
Very often, and particularly in case of decedents' estates, the subject of
administration is "covered" in the last two or three class-meetings or is
entirely omitted. While the present casebook cries for a preceding course
based upon a casebook similar to the editor's unpublished first volume, it can
be used in schools which retain separate courses in Wills and Trusts omit-
ting therefrom the topics of administration. Even with the traditional Trusts
course which includes the administration of trust estates, the present volume
with appropriate omissions is a splendid vehicle for a separate course in the
administration of decedents' estates. In some law schools the necessary
curricular adjustments will be thought to be insurmountable obstacles to the
adoption of the work. This will be particularly true where different instruc-
tors handle the courses in Wills and Trusts. In addition, some faculties will
believe that legal education calls for a single basic course in Trusts including
both express and implied trusts and trust administration as well. The whole
problem is one upon which reasonable minds may differ. There should be
no doubt, however, that Professor Simes has done a difficult job well and
has produced a notable contribution to the study of this field of the law.
THOMAs E. ATICINSONt
tProfessor of Law, University of Missouri.
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